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This paper examines if the folk theorem of perfect competition holds under
Bertrand competition, both when entry is exogenous, as well as free. Inter
alia, it also characterizes the limit equilibrium sets.
We focus on price competition when ﬁrms supply all demand. The as-
sumption that ﬁrms supply all demand can, in fact, be traced back to Cham-
berlin (1933).1 This assumption is appropriate when the costs of turning
away customers are very high (see Dixon (1990), or Vives (1999)). Such
costs may arise because of either reputational reasons, or governmental reg-
ulations. Vives (1999) argues that such regulations are operative in U.S.
industries like electricity and telephone.
We study the properties of the limit equilibrium set under Bertrand com-
petition both when entry is exogenous, as well as when it is free. Under the
exogenous entry approach, pioneered by Ruﬃn (1971) and Okuguchi (1973)
for the case of Cournot competition, we solve for the n-ﬁrm Bertrand equi-
librium where demand is given and all ﬁrms are active in equilibrium. Under
the free entry approach, pioneered by Novshek (1980) for the case of Cournot
competition, we consider an r-fold replication demand and then solve for the
free entry Bertrand equilibrium where at least one ﬁrm is inactive. We then
examine the limit equilibrium sets under both these approaches. The ob-
jective is to examine if, for the Bertrand framework, the folk theorem of
perfect competition holds, in the sense that the set of limit equilibrium
prices contains the perfectly competitive price(s), and no other price(s).2
We then brieﬂy summarize our main results.
1It has also been adopted, among others, by authors like Bulow, Geanakoplos and
Klemperer (1985), Dastidar (1995), Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), and Vives (1990,
1999).
2While the folk theorem is relatively well explored in the Cournot framework, (see,
among others, Novshek (1980), Okuguchi (1973) and Ruﬃn (1971)), it is much less so in
the Bertrand framework.
1First consider the case with exogenous entry. To begin with we charac-
terize the limit-equilibrium set. We then use this characterization to show
that the folk theorem fails to hold unless average cost is constant (and, for
all prices greater than the average cost, the demand function achieves its
maximum at the average cost).
Under the free entry case, we begin by characterizing the limit equilib-
rium set for average cost functions that are ultimately either increasing, or
decreasing. For these class of cost functions we demonstrate that the folk
theorem fails to hold. However, it does hold if the average cost function
is constant (and, for all prices greater than the average cost, the demand
function achieves its maximum at the average cost).
Finally, in the Appendix we show that irrespective of whether entry is
exogenous, or free, our results regarding the folk theorem goes through even
if we allow for multiple price equilibria.
We then relate our paper to the literature. This problem has been ex-
amined earlier by Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) (NRC from now
on), though for the case when the demand function is negatively sloped and
the average cost function is primarily either U-shaped, or increasing.3 The
assumptions on the demand and the cost functions imposed by NRC are
certainly quite reasonable. Given the importance of the issue, however, it is
of interest to re-examine the problem under a minimal set of restrictions on
the demand and the cost functions.
Hence in this paper we essentially only assume that the demand function
is continuous and intersects both the axes, and that the cost function is
continuous (except possibly at the origin). Moreover, for the free entry
case the average cost function is assumed to be ultimately monotonic. In
particular, we do not assume that the demand function is negatively sloped,
or that the average cost function is either increasing, or U-shaped. Further,
3NRC, of course, also characterize the limit equilibrium set when average costs are
constant, or decreasing, or have a capacity constraint.
2in the paper we derive conditions under which the characterizations derived
in this paper coincide with those in NRC.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
describe the model. The case with exogenous entry is analyzed in Section
3, whereas Section 4 considers the case with free entry. Section 5 concludes.
In the Appendix we allow for multiple price equilibria.
2 The Model
The market M(n) comprises the demand function f(p) and n ﬁrms, all
producing a single homogeneous good, and having the same cost function,
c(q) and the average cost function AC(q).4
The market demand function f(p) satisﬁes the following assumption.
Assumption 1: (a) f : [0,∞) → [0,∞).5 Moreover, f(p) is continuous.
(b) There exists a choke-oﬀ price ˆ p (> 0) such that, ∀p ≥ ˆ p, f(p) = 0,
and, ∀p < ˆ p, f(p) > 0.
Note that the demand function is not necessarily negatively sloped.6
The cost function satisﬁes the following assumption.
Assumption 2: (a) c : [0,∞) → [0,∞). Moreover, c(0) = 0 and
c(q) > 0, ∀q > 0.
(b) The cost function is continuous, except possibly at the origin.
(c) AC : (0,∞) → (0,∞).7 Moreover, there exists p such that p >
4For ease of comparison, the notations in this paper closely follow those in NRC.
5Note that this implies that f(0) is ﬁnite.
6Other papers to allow for a general class of demand functions include, among others,
Allen and Hellwig (1986) and Maskin (1986) (both these papers are in the Bertrand-
Edgeworth framework).
7Given Assumptions 2(a) and 2(b), AC(q) is well deﬁned and continuous on (0,∞).
3AC(f(p)).8 Finally, b = limq→0 AC(q) is well deﬁned (allowing for inﬁnity
as a possible limit).
Note that we do not assume that the average cost function is necessarily
either increasing, or U-shaped (we say that AC(q) is U-shaped if there exists
q∗ > 0 such that the average cost function is strictly decreasing for all
0 < q < q∗, and strictly increasing for all q > q∗).
We examine a game of Bertrand competition where the ﬁrms simultane-
ously announce their prices, and the Chamberlin (1933) assumption holds.
Assumption 3. The ﬁrms supply all demand.
Let Di(p1,···,pi,···,pn) denote the residual or contingent demand fac-
ing ﬁrm i when the announced price vector is (p1,···,pi,···,pn). We assume
that the residual demand is the parallel, or the eﬃcient one.9 Further, ﬁrms








where mi denotes the number of ﬁrms charging pi.
The proﬁt of the i-th ﬁrm
πi(p1,···,pn) = (pi − AC(Di(p1,···,pn)))Di(p1,···,pn). (2)
We solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, i.e. Bertrand
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition. A Bertrand equilibrium for the market M(n) consists of a
8This implies that the optimal monopoly proﬁt is strictly positive. It is equivalent to
the NRC assumption that f(p) and AC(q) intersect at least once in the p − q plane.
9Our results are not dependent on the speciﬁc rationing rule being used though.




In this paper we shall be mainly concerned with single price Bertrand
equilibria, where all active ﬁrms (i.e. ﬁrms with positive output) charge
the same price. For an important class of demand functions, i.e. negatively
sloped ones, it is easy to see that all Bertrand equilibria are necessarily single
priced (follows from Assumption 3).10
Finally, a Bertrand equilibrium is said to be a free entry equilibrium if
some of the ﬁrms are not active, i.e. have zero demand.
3 Exogenous Entry
In this section we examine a situation where the number of active ﬁrms is
taken to be exogenously given. We study the limiting equilibrium outcomes
as the number of active ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity. Following NRC, we character-
ize the set of all prices p such that if the number of ﬁrms n is large enough,
then, for the market M(n), there is some single price equilibrium where all
ﬁrms are active and the equilibrium price is arbitrarily close to p.
Deﬁnition: S = {p : there is a sequence p(n) that converges to p
such that, for each suﬃciently large n, all ﬁrms setting a price p(n) is an
equilibrium for the market M(n)}.
We need some more notations before we can characterize S.
c∗ = infq AC(q).11
˜ p = argmaxp∈[0,ˆ p] f(p).12
10For Cournot competition also, all equilibria are single priced. In the Appendix we
brieﬂy allow for equilibria that are not single-priced.
11Given that AC : (0,∞) → (0,∞), c
∗ is ﬁnite.
12Given that f(p) is continuous, ˜ p and f(˜ p) are well deﬁned.
5˜ d = inf {p : p > AC(f(p))}.13
d is the minimum p such that AC(f(p)) = p.14
F(r) = {p : ∀ p0 > p, either (a) f(p0) ≤ f(p), or (b) f(p0) > f(p) and
p0 ≤ AC(rf(p0) − rf(p))}.15 For ease of exposition we write F(1) = F.
p = argmaxp∈(c∗,ˆ p] f(p).
For any set A, let A denote the closure of A.
We then impose the following regularity condition.
Assumption 4. (i) If b = ˜ d, then the cost function is either linear, or
there exists t > 0 such that AC(q) is negatively sloped for all q ∈ (0,t).
(ii) If p is well deﬁned, then f(p) 6= f(c∗).
It may be argued that Assumption 4 is not very strong.16 Recall that
in the NRC framework, b = ˜ d implies that the average cost function is
U-shaped, so that Assumption 4 is necessarily satisﬁed.
Proposition 1 below characterizes the set S.
13Given Assumption 2(c), the set {p : p > AC(f(p))} is non-empty. Since p = 0 is a
lower bound, there is a least upper bound. Hence ˜ d is ﬁnite.
14Given Assumption 2(c), d is well deﬁned.
15Clearly, F(r) is closed. Suppose p / ∈ F(r). Then ∃p
0 > p such that f(p
0) > f(p) and
p
0 > AC(rf(p
0) − rf(p)). Clearly, for any p + ,  > 0 but suﬃciently small, p
0 > p + ,
f(p
0) > f(p + ) and p
0 > AC(rf(p
0) − rf(p + )).
16Consider 4(i). This is because in general b 6= ˜ d. Take f(p) and AC(q) such that b = ˜ d.
Now if the two functions are perturbed slightly (in an appropriate manner), then it will no
longer be the case that b = ˜ d. For example, consider the family of demand functions λf(p),
λ diﬀerent from, but close to 1. Let ˜ d(λ) denote the appropriately modiﬁed version of ˜ d
for the demand function λf(p). Assuming that AC(q) does not have horizontal segments,
and f(p) does not have vertical segments (in the p−q plane), for λ close to 1, ˜ d(λ) 6= ˜ d = b.
Next consider 4(ii). Suppose that f(p) = f(c
∗). Let us perturb AC(q) by considering the
family of functions λAC(q), where λ is close to 1. Thus unless c
∗ = 0, c
∗(λ) 6= c
∗, for
λ 6= 1 (where c
∗(λ) is the obvious extension of c
∗ for λf(p)). Thus if f(p) does not have
a vertical section then, for λ close enough to 1, f(p) 6= f(c
∗(λ)).
6Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold.
(i) If b < ˜ d, then S = (b, ˜ d) ∩ F.
(ii) If b > ˜ d, then S is empty.
(iii) If b = ˜ d, then S = {b}, if either (a) AC(q) is constant, and p is not
well deﬁned, or (b) there exists some sequence < p(n) > in F such that, ∀n,
p(n) < b, and < p(n) > converges to b. Otherwise, S is empty.
Proof: To begin with we argue that no price less than b, or greater than
˜ d, or not in F, can belong in S. Suppose that p(n) converges to p as n
increases and for each suﬃciently large n, all n ﬁrms setting a price p(n) is
an equilibrium for M(n).
Note that the output per active ﬁrm is at most
f(˜ p)
n , which converges to
zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Thus if p < b, then for all suﬃciently large n,
p(n) < AC(
f(p(n))
n ), so that p(n) cannot be an equilibrium price.





is less than (ˆ p − c∗)
f(˜ p)
n . Thus, for n large, proﬁt per active ﬁrm con-
verges to zero. Moreover, from the deﬁnition of ˜ d, there exists p0 such that
˜ d < p0 < p(n) and p0 > AC(f(p0)). Undercutting to such a price p0 yields a
strictly positive proﬁt that depends on p0, but not on n. Thus, for n large,
undercutting is strictly proﬁtable.
Next consider some p / ∈ F. As argued earlier, for n large, proﬁt per active
ﬁrm goes to zero. Since p / ∈ F, there exists p0 > p such that f(p0) > f(p)
and [p0 − AC(f(p0) − f(p))][f(p0) − f(p)] > 0. Given that F is closed, for n






Hence one of the ﬁrms can deviate to p0, and make a strict gain.
We then argue that every price in the interval (b, ˜ d) ∩ F is in the limit
set. If p > b, then, for any suﬃciently large n, if n ﬁrms set such a price
then each ﬁrm will produce an output at which p exceeds average cost, and
thus obtain a positive proﬁt. Undercutting is unproﬁtable since for any p
7strictly less than ˜ d, an undercutting ﬁrm cannot make a positive proﬁt as
p ≤ AC(f(p)). Finally, since p ∈ F, none of the ﬁrms can charge a higher
price and gain.
Next we consider p ∈ (b, ˜ d) ∩ F − (b, ˜ d) ∩ F. Suppose b < ˜ d. Since
p ∈ (b, ˜ d) ∩ F, any such p can be obtained as the limits of appropriate
sequences of equilibrium prices, p(n), described above.
Finally, let b = ˜ d < ˆ p.17 First suppose average cost is constant, and p
is not well deﬁned. Since p is not well deﬁned, f(c∗) > f(p), for all p > c∗
(otherwise ∃p > c∗ such that f(p) ≥ f(c∗). But then p = argmax[c∗,ˆ p] f(p),
which is well deﬁned). Then p = b = c∗ can be sustained as a Bertrand
equilibrium for all n. Further, any p > b will be undercut. Whereas if
AC(q) is constant, and p is well deﬁned, then the only possible equilibrium
involves the ﬁrms charging b = c∗, when they have an incentive to deviate
to p. This follows since from Assumption 4(ii), f(p) > f(c∗).
Next, given Assumption 4(i), we assume that there exists t > 0 such that
AC(q) is negatively sloped for all q ∈ (0,t). Consider some p ∈ (AC(t),b).
Let e q(p) be the unique q, 0 < q < t, such that AC(e q(p)) = p. Next, let n(p)
satisfy
f(p)
n(p) = e q(p), where n(p) can be a non-integer. Given that f(b) > 0
and limp↑b e q(p) = 0, it follows that limp↑b n(p) → ∞. Next, let ˜ n(p) be
the largest possible integer such that p ≥ AC(
f(p)
n ) (this is well deﬁned
for n(p) large enough). Clearly, there exists some largest interval (b0,b),
AC(t) ≤ b0 < b, such that for all p ∈ (b0,b), ˜ n(p) is well deﬁned. Given that
|n(p) − ˜ n(p)| < 1 and limp↑b n(p) → ∞, we have that limp↑b ˜ n(p) → ∞. Let
ˆ n = minp∈(b0,b) ˜ n(p).
We then construct a sequence < p(n) >⊆ F such that ∀i ∈ {0,1,2,...},
p(ˆ n + i) is some p ∈ (b0,b) such that ˆ n + i = ˜ n(p). Note that for n ≥ ˆ n, the
pair (n,p(n)) belongs to the graph of ˜ n(p). Thus p(n) ≥ AC(
f(p(n))
n ), so that
all ﬁrms earn non-negative proﬁts. Moreover, since p(n) < b = ˜ d, no ﬁrm can
17Since f(p) is negatively sloped at ˆ p, it cannot be the case that b = ˜ d > ˆ p. If b = ˜ d = ˆ p,
then all ﬁrms charging ˆ p and having zero demand and supply is an equilibrium for M(n).
8undercut proﬁtably. Finally, we argue that the sequence < p(n) > converges
to b. Suppose not. Then there exists some  > 0 and some sub-sequence





ni = 0. Hence, for ni large enough, p(ni) < AC(
f(ni)
ni ). This,
however, is a contradiction since for all ni, (ni,p(ni)) belongs to the graph
of ˜ n(p).
3.1 The Folk Theorem
We next use Proposition 1 to examine whether the folk theorem of perfect
competition holds or not, i.e. if S = {c∗}.
Deﬁnition. f(p) is said to be of limited variation if, ∀p ∈ [c∗, ˆ p], ∃(p) >
0, such that f(p) is monotonic over [p,p + (p)].
We need one more assumption before we can proceed further.
Assumption 5. (i) f(p) is of limited variation.
(ii) If b = c∗, then AC(q) is either constant, or increasing.
It can be argued that Assumption 5(ii) is not very strong.18 We can now
write down our next proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Then
S = {c∗}, if and only if AC(q) is constant and p is not well deﬁned.
Proof. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. c∗ < b. Since c∗ / ∈ (b, ˜ d) ∩ F, the folk theorem cannot hold.
Case 2. c∗ = b (thus b is ﬁnite). From Assumption 5(ii), AC(q) is either
constant, or increasing. To begin with we consider the case where AC(q) is
18One can argue that in general b 6= c
∗. Let us perturb AC(q) by considering the family
of functions AC(q)+αq, where α is close to 1. Unless c
∗ is achieved at q = 0 (this is true
if AC(q) is increasing or constant), then, for α close to zero, c
∗(α) 6= c
∗ = b.
9increasing, so that b = c∗ < ˜ d. From Assumption 5(i), ∃(c∗) > 0, such that
f(p) is monotonic over [c∗,c∗ + (c∗)]. We consider two sub-cases.
Case (2a). Suppose p is not well deﬁned. Then f(p) is negatively
sloped over [c∗,c∗ + (c∗)]. (Suppose not, then ∃p ∈ (c∗,c∗ + (c∗)] such
that f(p) ≥ f(c∗). But then p = argmaxp∈[c∗,ˆ p]f(p), which is well deﬁned.)
W.l.o.g. let (c∗) < ˜ d. Suppose there exists some p ∈ (c∗,c∗ + (c∗)], such
that f(p0) ≤ f(p), ∀p0 > p, then p ∈ F, and hence p ∈ S. Since p > c∗, S 6=
{c∗}. Thus, we next consider the case where no such p exists. Then we can
ﬁnd a monotone decreasing sequence < p(n) > in (c∗,c∗ +(c∗)] converging
to c∗ such that ∀p(n), ∃p0(p(n))) > p(n), such that f(p0(p(n))) > f(p(n)).
Fix some n such that f(p0(p(n)) > f(p(n)). Since f(p) is decreasing over
[c∗,c∗ + (c∗)], f(p0(p(n))) > f(p(n)), ∀n > n. Taking limits, f(p0(p(n))) ≥
f(c∗). However, in that case p = argmaxp∈[c∗,ˆ p]f(p), which is well deﬁned.
Case (2b). We next consider the case where p is well deﬁned. Clearly,
f(p) ≥ f(c∗). In fact, from Assumption 4(ii), f(p) > f(c∗). Then, from the
continuity of f(p), ∃p(c∗) > c∗ such that f(p(c∗)) = f(c∗) and, ∀p0(c∗)
strictly less than, but suﬃciently close to p(c∗), f(p0(c∗)) > f(c∗) and
p0(c∗) > AC(f(p0(c∗))−f(c∗)) (this follows since limp0(c∗)→p(c∗) AC(f(p0(c∗))−
f(c∗)) = b < p(c∗)). Thus ∃p0(c∗) > c∗ such that f(p0(c∗)) > f(c∗) and
[p0(c∗) − AC(f(p0(c∗)) − f(c∗))][f(p0(c∗)) − f(c∗)] = 2δ, where δ > 0. Hence
∃0 > 0 such that ∀p ∈ [c∗,c∗+0], ∃p0(p) > p, such that f(p0(p)) > f(p) and
[p0(p) − AC(f(p0(p)) − f(p))][f(p0(p)) − f(p)] > δ > 0. Consider a sequence
< p(n) > converging to c∗, such that p(n) is an equilibrium for M(n). We
then note that ∃n0 such that for all n > n0, p(n) < c∗ + 0, and the proﬁt of
the active ﬁrms is less than δ. Hence they have an incentive to deviate to
p0(p).
Finally, we consider the case where AC(q) is constant. Note that any
single price equilibrium must involve all the ﬁrms charging c∗ (any p > c∗ will
be undercut). Suppose p is not well deﬁned. Then, ∀p > c∗, f(c∗) > f(p).
Thus, ∀n, there is an equilibrium where all the ﬁrms charge c∗. Next suppose
10p is well deﬁned, so that from Assumption 4(ii), f(p) > f(c∗). But then,
the ﬁrms charging c∗ will have an incentive to deviate to p.
Thus, in the class of continuous demand and cost functions (the cost
function may possibly be discontinuous at the origin), the folk theorem fails
unless the average cost function is constant and p is not well deﬁned.
Finally, let us relate our results to those for Cournot competition with
exogenous entry. It is well known that the folk theorem goes through if
average cost is constant. Further, from Ruﬃn (1971), the folk theorem goes
through if AC(q) is increasing, but not if its U-shaped, and the cost function
is continuous.
Remark. While we adopt the eﬃcient rationing rule, it is easy to see
that Proposition 1 goes through for other rationing rules, including the
proportional one. This follows since the choice of the rationing rule does
not aﬀect the deﬁnition of F, which is what we need for Proposition 1.
3.2 Relating Proposition 1 to NRC
We then relate the characterization of S in Proposition 1 to the correspond-
ing one in NRC (i.e. Theorem 1). Note that if the demand function is
negatively sloped, then F = [0,∞). Further, if the average cost function is
either increasing, or U-shaped, and b ≤ ˜ d, then ˜ d = d.19 Thus under these
assumptions the characterization of S in Proposition 1 coincides with that
in NRC.
We then argue that for negatively sloped demand functions, the char-
acterization of S in NRC holds for a large class of cost functions satisfying
some mild regularity condition.
19If b ≤ ˜ d, then, under the NRC formulation, the average cost function must be positively
sloped at ˜ d. Thus there does not exist any p
0 < ˜ d such that p
0 = AC(f(p
0)). Of course if
b > ˜ d, then S is empty.
11Deﬁnition. f(p) is said to be tangent to AC(q) at some p, if p =
AC(f(p)) and ∃(p) > 0 such that ∀p ∈ (p − (p),p) ∪ (p,p + (p)), either
p ≥ AC(f(p)), or p ≤ AC(f(p)).
Assumption 6. At any p < ˜ d such that p = AC(f(p)), the demand
and the average cost functions cannot be tangent to each other.
Note that assumption 6 above is not very strong.20
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 hold and let the
demand function be negatively sloped. Then S = [b,d] if b ≤ d, S is empty
otherwise.
Proof. Note that F = [0,∞) since the demand function is negatively
sloped. Hence given Proposition 1, it is suﬃcient to show that, under As-
sumption 6, ˜ d = d. Clearly, ˜ d = AC(f(˜ d)). Since d is the minimum p such
that p = AC(f(p)), ˜ d ≥ d. Next suppose that ˜ d > d. From the deﬁnition of
˜ d, p ≤ AC(f(p)) for all p ∈ [0, ˜ d). Moreover, since d = AC(f(d)), f(p) and
AC(q) are tangent to each other at d, thus violating assumption 6.
Thus, Theorem 1 in NRC can be substantially generalized to allow for
a large class of average cost functions. In contrast, the assumption that the
demand function be negatively sloped appears much more critical. In fact,
if the average cost function is increasing, then the negativity of the demand
function is necessary in the following sense: Suppose to the contrary that
there is some b < p < d such that the demand function is positively sloped
in a neighborhood of p. It is easy to show that such a p cannot belong to
20Suppose there is some p < ˜ d such that p = AC(f(p)), and the demand and the average
cost functions are tangent to each other. Then, for any λf(p), λ not equal to 1, but close
to it, we can ﬁnd a neighborhood of p such that the functions are not tangent to each
other at any price in the neighborhood.
12S.21 If, however, the average cost is U-shaped, then Theorem 1 in NRC may
go through even if the demand function is not negatively sloped.22
4 Free Entry
Let M(r,n) denote a market with the demand function rf(p) and n ﬁrms.
In this section we examine equilibria when market size is large, and there
is free entry of ﬁrms, where free entry is formalized as there being inactive
ﬁrms in equilibrium. Hence we examine n-ﬁrm single price equilibria where
m (< n) ﬁrms are active (i.e. set the lowest price), and n−m (> 0) ﬁrms are
inactive (i.e. charge higher prices and have no demand). We then study the
limiting equilibria as the market demand goes to inﬁnity. We characterize
the set of all prices p such that if r is suﬃciently large, then, for M(r,n),
there is some free entry equilibrium where the market price is arbitrarily
close to p.
Deﬁnition: T = {p : there is a sequence p(r) that converges to p such
that for each suﬃciently large r, there is an integer n and an equilibrium
for the market M(r,n) in which all active ﬁrms charge the lowest price p(r),
but not all ﬁrms set the price p(r)}.
We focus on average cost functions that are ultimately increasing.
Assumption 7. There exists some smallest ˜ q such that AC(q) is strictly
21Suppose there is an equilibrium where all ﬁrms charge p(n) which is suﬃciently close
to p. Then, for n large enough, the proﬁt level of all such ﬁrms is close to zero. Since
f(p(n)) is positively sloped at p(n), and p(n) > b, one of the ﬁrms can deviate to p(n)+,
and, for  small enough, obtain a positive proﬁt that is independent of n. Thus for n large
enough, deviating to p(n) +  is proﬁtable.
22Consider an U-shaped average cost function, and let the demand function be positively
sloped over the interval [p
0,p
00], and negatively sloped otherwise. In order to rule out trivial
cases, we assume that c
∗ < p
0. Let AC(q) > p, ∀q ≤ f(p
00)−f(p
0). In that case F = [0,∞),
and Theorem 1 in NRC goes through.
13increasing for all q > ˜ q.
Note that Assumption 7 is satisﬁed by both the increasing, as well as the
U-shaped average cost function. If AC(q) is increasing, then ˜ q = 0, whereas
if AC(q) is U-shaped, then ˜ q = q∗.
Next let
d(r) = argmax p such that AC(rf(p))=p f(p).
Further, let d∗ = limr→∞ d(r).
Given Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 7, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For c∗ < ˆ p, d∗ is well deﬁned. Moreover, if d∗ is well deﬁned,
then ˆ p ≥ d∗ > c∗.
Proof. If c∗ < ˆ p, then, for r suﬃciently large, d(r) is well deﬁned.
Further, for r large enough, rf(d(r)) > ˜ q, so that AC(q) is strictly increasing
in q. Hence d(r) is increasing in r. Further, d(r) ≤ ˆ p. Thus d∗ exists, and,
moreover, d∗ ≤ ˆ p. Finally, since d(r) ≥ c∗, and d(r) is strictly increasing for
r large, c∗ < d∗.
We need some further notations.
Lat q(p) be the minimum q0 such that, AC(q0) = p and AC(q) is strictly
negatively sloped at q0.
V = {p : q(p) is well deﬁned.}
˜ F = {p : ∃ some sequence < p(r) > converging to p such that p(r) ∈
F(r), ∀r.}23
We are ﬁnally in a position to characterize the set T.
23Clearly, ˜ F is closed. Consider some sequence < pn > converging to p, where pn ∈ ˜ p ∀n.
Using the triangle inequality it is straightforward to show that ∃ some sequence < p(r) >
converging to p such that p(r) ∈ F(r), ∀r.
14Proposition 4. Assume that c∗ < ˆ p and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 7
hold. Then T = [c∗,d∗] ∩ V ∩ ˜ F.
Proof. Note that since c∗ < ˆ p, d∗ is well deﬁned from Lemma 1. Further,
given Assumption 7, the interval [c∗,d∗] is non-empty. Next suppose to the
contrary that p(r) converges to some p outside [c∗,d∗]∩V ∩ ˜ F as r increases,
and for each suﬃciently large r, there is an n and an equilibrium for M(r,n)
in which p(r) is the lowest price, but not all ﬁrms charge p(r).
Clearly, p(r) ≥ c∗, ∀r, so p ≥ c∗. We then argue that any equilibrium
price p(r) < d∗. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. d∗ = ˆ p. Deﬁne p0(r) as the maximum p satisfying rf(p) = q∗.
Clearly, p0(r) is deﬁned for r large enough. Further, p0(r) < ˆ p.24 Moreover,
since rf(p) is negatively sloped at p0(r), p0(r) is increasing in r. Hence
limr→∞ p0(r) is well deﬁned. Also note that limr→∞ p0(r) = ˆ p.25 Since
ˆ p > c∗, for r suﬃciently large, ˆ p > p0(r) > c∗. Now suppose to the contrary
that p(r) ≥ d∗ = ˆ p. Then p(r) ≥ ˆ p > p0(r) > c∗. But then an inactive ﬁrm
could undercut by charging p0(r), and make a strictly positive proﬁt.
Case 2. d∗ < ˆ p. Since d∗ < ˆ p, from Assumption 1(b), f(d∗) > 0.
Thus for r suﬃciently large, rf(d∗) > ˜ q. Moreover, since AC(q) is strictly
increasing for q > ˜ q, it follows that AC(rf(d∗)) < d∗. From continuity, for
 > 0 small enough, AC(rf(d∗ − )) < d∗ − . Now suppose to the contrary
that p(r) ≥ d∗. Then p(r) ≥ d∗ > AC(rf(d∗)). But then, for  > 0 but
suﬃciently small, an inactive ﬁrm could deviate to price d∗−, sell rf(d∗−)
and earn a strictly positive proﬁt.
Next consider some p / ∈ V . Thus p is such that ∀q0(p) satisfying AC(q) =
p, AC(q) is strictly positively sloped at q0(p). In case such a q0(p) does not
exist, then p > AC(q) for all q, and an inactive ﬁrm can match p and make
24Suppose not. Then, from Assumption 1(b), q
∗ = rf(p
0(r)) = 0. Since q
∗ > 0, this is
a contradiction.
25Suppose not. Let limr→∞ p
0(r) = ˜ p < ˆ p. Then limr→∞ f(p
0(r)) = f(˜ p) > 0. Hence,
q
∗ = limr→∞ rf(p
0(r)) → ∞, which is a contradiction.
15a gain. So suppose such a q0(p) exists. For p ∈ T there must be some market
M(r,n) and some free entry equilibrium such that all active ﬁrms charge p0,
where p0 is arbitrarily close to p, and there are some inactive ﬁrms. Since V
is closed, p0 / ∈ V and AC(q) is positively sloped at q0(p0). Since the active
ﬁrms make non-negative proﬁts, the output level of any active ﬁrm is less
than equal to q0(p0). Then an inactive ﬁrm can match p0 and earn a strictly
positive proﬁt.
We then consider some p / ∈ ˜ F. Suppose to the contrary that p ∈ T. Then
we can ﬁnd a sequence < p(r) > converging to p such that p(r) constitutes
a free entry equilibrium for rf(p). Then p(r) ∈ F(r), ∀r, otherwise some of
the inactive ﬁrms can deviate to some appropriate p0 > p(r), and make a
positive proﬁt. However, this implies that p ∈ ˜ F.
Consider any p such that c∗ < p < d∗ and p ∈ V ∩ ˜ F. We argue that
any such p must be in the limit set. Since p ∈ ˜ F, there exists a sequence
< p(rn) > converging to p such that p(rn) ∈ F(rn), ∀rn. Without loss of
generality let < p(rn) >⊆ V . Consider q(p(rn)) (since p(rn) ∈ V, AC(q)
is negatively sloped at q(p(rn))). Let N(rn) be the largest integer such
that N(rn) <
rnf(p(rn))
q(p(rn)) . For rn suﬃciently large, AC(
rnf(p(rn))
N(rn) ) < p ≤
AC(
rnf(p(rn))
N(rn)+1 ). Let N(rn) ﬁrms each set the price p(rn) in the rn-market
and share demand equally, and let one ﬁrm set a higher price. Then the
active ﬁrms all earn a positive proﬁt. If one of them, or the inactive ﬁrms
undercuts the price, then that ﬁrm must produce to meet a demand that
exceeds rnf, where f = minc∗≤p0≤p f(p0) > 0. But as rn gets large, AC(rnf)
either approaches or exceeds d∗ > p(rn). Also, if an inactive ﬁrm matches
the lowest price, by the properties of N(rn) the ﬁrm at best has a proﬁt of
zero. Since p(rn) ∈ F(rn), none of the ﬁrms can charge a higher price and
gain. Thus for each suﬃciently large rn, p(rn) is an equilibrium price for r,
and thus is in the limit set.
Finally, all p in [c∗,d∗] ∩ V ∩ ˜ F − (c∗,d∗) ∩ V ∩ ˜ F can be obtained as
limits of appropriate sequences of p(r).
16We then argue that if the average cost function is ultimately decreasing,
then T is empty. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 6 hold. Suppose that there
exists some minimum − → q such that AC(q) is negatively sloped for all q > − → q .
Further, ∀q, let AC(q) > limq0→∞ AC(q0), . For r suﬃciently large, d(r)
exists, rf(d(r)) > − → q , and d(r) satisﬁes AC(rf(p)) = p. Now, for any n > 1,
any price above d(r) can be undercut. Whereas if there is a single ﬁrm
charging d(r), then it can increase its price slightly and make a positive
proﬁt.
4.1 The Folk Theorem
We then use Proposition 4 to examine if the folk theorem holds in this
framework or not, i.e. if T = {c∗}.
Proposition 5. Suppose that c∗ < ˆ p and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5
hold.
(i) If Assumption 7 holds, then the folk theorem fails to holds.
(ii) If c∗ = b, then the folk theorem holds if and only if AC(q) is constant
and p is not well deﬁned.
Proof. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Suppose c∗ < b. Then [c∗,b] ⊆ V . There are two sub-cases to
consider:
1(a). First, consider the case where p is not well deﬁned. We can then
mimic the proof of Case 2(a) of Proposition 2 to argue that ∃(c∗) > 0 such
that ∃p ∈ (c∗,c∗ + (c∗)], so that f(p0(p)) ≤ f(p), ∀p0(p) > p. W.l.o.g. let
(c∗) < b. But then p ∈ F(r), ∀F(r), and hence p ∈ ˜ F. Thus T 6= {c∗}.
1(b). Next suppose p is well deﬁned. Then f(p) > f(c∗). Thus, ∀r, we
can ﬁnd some p0(c∗,r) > c∗ such that f(p0(c∗,r)) > f(c∗), and rf(p0(c∗,r))−
rf(c∗) is small enough such that p0(c∗,r) > AC(rf(p0(c∗,r))−rf(c∗)). Thus
∃0 > 0, such that ∀p ∈ [c∗,c∗+0], ∃p0(p,r) > p such that f(p0(p,r)) > f(p)
17and [p0(p,r) − AC(rf(p0(p,r)) − rf(p))] > 0. Thus such a p cannot be
sustained as a free entry equilibrium for any r, however large, as one of
inactive ﬁrms can deviate to p0(p,r) and make a gain. Thus c∗ cannot be
sustained as a limit of free entry equilibrium price sequence < p(r) >.
Case 2. Suppose c∗ = b. Then, from Assumption 5(ii), AC(q) is either
increasing, or constant. First consider the case where AC(q) is increasing.
Then no p > b can be sustained as a free entry equilibrium for any r.
Suppose not. Then, for any such p, one of the inactive ﬁrms can match this
price and make a positive proﬁt.
We next consider the case where AC(q) is constant. Note that any single
price equilibrium must involve all the ﬁrms charging c∗. Suppose p is not
well deﬁned. Then, ∀p > c∗, f(c∗) > f(p). Thus, ∀r, there is a free entry
equilibrium where all the active ﬁrms charge c∗. Further, there is no other
free entry equilibrium. Next suppose p is well deﬁned, so that f(p) > f(c∗).
But then, given Assumption 4(ii), the active ﬁrms will have an incentive to
deviate to p.
Thus, for the class of average cost functions that are ultimately increas-
ing, the folk theorem for the free entry case holds if and only if AC(q) is
constant and p is not deﬁned. Next recall that if AC(q) is ultimately de-
creasing (and ∀q, AC(q) > limq0→∞ AC(q0),) then no price can be sustained
as a free entry equilibrium, so that the folk theorem fails. These results are
in sharp contrast to that for the Cournot case when Novshek (1980) shows
that the folk theorem goes through for U-shaped average cost functions.
4.2 Relating Proposition 4 to NRC
We then relate Proposition 4 to Theorem 2 in NRC. Recall that for neg-
atively sloped demand functions, F(r) = [0,∞), ∀r, so that ˜ F = [0,∞).
Further, for U-shaped average cost functions, V = {p : c∗ < p < b}. Thus,
if the demand function is negatively sloped and the average cost function is
18U-shaped, T = [c∗, min{b,d∗}], so that the two characterizations coincide.
Thus Proposition 4 extends Theorem 2 in NRC to demand functions that
are not necessarily negatively sloped, and to average cost functions that are
ultimately increasing.
We then use Proposition 4 to show, that for negatively sloped demand
functions, the characterization in NRC hold for a larger class of average cost
functions than the U-shaped one.
Deﬁne b0 = max{p : p = AC(q0) where q0 is a local maximizer of AC(q)}.
Proposition 6. Assume that c∗ < ˆ p (so that d∗ is well deﬁned) and
assumptions 1, 2 and 5 hold. If the demand function is negatively sloped
and max{b0,d∗} ≤ b, then T = [c∗, min{b,d∗}].
Proof. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Let b0 ≤ b. Given Proposition 4, it is suﬃcient to observe that
V = {p : c∗ < p < b}.
Case 2. Let d∗ ≤ b. Given Proposition 4, it is suﬃcient to observe that
{p : c∗ < p < b} ⊆ V .
Thus, the characterization of the limit equilibrium set T in NRC can be
generalized to allow for a class of average cost functions that are ultimately
increasing, and max{b0,d∗} ≤ b.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we examine if the folk theorem of perfect competition goes
through under Bertrand competition (where ﬁrms supply all demand). We
allow for a large class of demand and cost functions where we essentially
only assume that the demand function is continuous and intersects both the
axes, and that the cost function is continuous (except possibly at the origin).
We ﬁnd that the folk theorem fails to hold for a large class of demand and
19cost functions. In fact, for the folk theorem to hold, it is in some sense
necessary that the cost function be linear.
Inter alia, we also characterize the limit equilibrium sets and relate the
characterizations obtained in this paper to those in NRC.
206 Appendix: Multiple Price Equilibria
In this appendix we allow for multiple price equilibria and examine if ana-
logues of our earlier results go through.
6.1 Exogenous Entry
For the market M(n), let P(n) = (p1(n),···,pn(n)) denote a multiple price
Bertrand equilibrium (MPE) with exogenous entry (so that all ﬁrms are
active). For this case, the limit equilibrium set S0 is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: S0 = {p : there is a sequence < P(n) > such that for
∀ > 0, ∃n(), so that for each n > n(), all elements of P(n) belongs to an
-neighborhood of p}.
Proposition 7 below provides a partial characterization of S0.
Proposition 7. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold.
(i) If b < ˜ d, then S0 ⊇ (b, ˜ d) ∩ F. Further, no p < b, and no p > ˜ d
belongs to S0.
(ii) If b > ˜ d, then S is empty.
(iii) Suppose b = ˜ d.
(a) Let AC(q) be constant. If p is not well deﬁned, then S0 = {b},
whereas if p is well deﬁned, then S0 is empty.
(b) Suppose AC(q) is not constant. If there exists some sequence <
p(n) > in F such that, ∀n, p(n) < b, and < p(n) > converges to b, then
b ∈ S0.
Proof: To begin with we argue that no price less than b, or greater than
˜ d can belong in S0. Suppose not.
First let p < ˜ d. Consider some MPE, P(n), of M(n). Note that there
is some active ﬁrm which has an output of at most
f(˜ p)
n , which converges
21to zero as n goes to inﬁnity. Thus if p < b, then for all suﬃciently large n,
there is some active ﬁrm charging p(n) where p(n) < AC(
f(p(n))
n ), so that
p(n) cannot be an equilibrium price.
Next let p > ˜ d. Consider some MPE, P(n), of M(n). Note that there




n , is less than
(ˆ p − c∗)
f(˜ p)
n , which, for n large, converges to zero. Moreover, from the
deﬁnition of ˜ d, there exists p0 such that ˜ d < p0 < p(n) ∀p(n) ∈ {P(n)} and
p0 > AC(f(p0)). Undercutting to such a price p0 yields a strictly positive
proﬁt that depends on p0, but not on n. Thus, for n large, undercutting is
strictly proﬁtable for some active ﬁrm making a proﬁt less than (ˆ p−c∗)
f(˜ p)
n .
We can then mimic the argument in Proposition 1 to argue that every
price in the interval (b, ˜ d) ∩ F is in the limit set. We can similarly argue
that, for b < ˜ d, all p ∈ (b, ˜ d) ∩ F − (b, ˜ d) ∩ F, belongs to S0.
Next, let b = ˜ d < ˆ p. Suppose average cost is constant. We ﬁrst note that
in any MPE the least price charged by the ﬁrms, say p, must be c∗. (Suppose
not, i.e. p > c∗. Suppose that there are more than one ﬁrm charging p, then
this price will be undercut by the ﬁrms charging p. Next suppose that there
is exactly one ﬁrm charging p. Then, for n large, some of the other ﬁrms
will have a proﬁt close to zero, and will undercut p.) If p is not well deﬁned
then, ∀p > c∗, f(c∗) > f(p). Thus, ∀n, there is an equilibrium where all
the ﬁrms charge c∗. Further, there cannot be any other equilibrium. Next
suppose p is well deﬁned, so that f(p) > f(c∗). But then, the ﬁrms charging
c∗ will have an incentive to deviate to p when they earn a strictly positive
proﬁt.
Finally, for the case where b = ˜ d, but AC(q) is not constant, we can
mimic the proof in Proposition 1.
Proposition 7 above is an analogue of Proposition 1 earlier. Note, how-
ever, that we only achieve a partial characterization of S0. The characteriza-
tion would be complete if one can show that if p / ∈ F, then p / ∈ S0. Whether
22this is true is an open question.
We then argue that an analogue of Proposition 2 goes through.
Proposition 8. Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. Then
S0 = {c∗}, if and only if AC(q) is constant and p is not well deﬁned.
Proof. Case 1. c∗ < b. Consider some MPE for M(n), that is arbitrarily
close to c∗. Then there will be some ﬁrm that will be supplying at most
f(˜ p)
n .
Now suppose n is taken to inﬁnity, and w.l.o.g. assume that the identity of
the ﬁrm supplying at most
f(˜ p)
n remains the same. Then, for n suﬃciently
large, this ﬁrm makes a loss (since the average cost of this ﬁrm will be close
to b > c∗). Thus c∗ / ∈ S0.
Case 2. c∗ = b. From Assumption 5(ii), AC(q) is either constant, or
increasing. To begin with we consider the case where AC(q) is increasing,
so that b = c∗ < ˜ d. From Assumption 5(i), ∃˜ d > (c∗) > 0, such that f(p)
is monotonic over [c∗,c∗ + (c∗)]. We consider two sub-cases.
Case (2a). Suppose p is not well deﬁned. Then we can mimic the
argument in Proposition 2 to show that there exists ˜ d > p > c∗ such that
p ∈ F, so that p ∈ S0.
Case (2b). We next consider the case where p is well deﬁned. We can
mimic the argument in Proposition 2 to claim that there exists 0 < 0 ≤ (c∗)
such that ∀p ∈ [c∗,c∗ + 0], ∃p0(p) > p, such that f(p0(p)) > f(p) and
[p0(p) − AC(f(p0(p)) − f(p))][f(p0(p)) − f(p)] > δ > 0. Consider some MPE
for M(n) where n is suﬃciently large so that the maximum price charged
is c∗ < p(n) < c∗ + 0. The proﬁt of all active ﬁrms are bounded above by
(p(n)−c∗)f(˜ p). Thus for p(n) close to c∗, the proﬁt of all active ﬁrms is less
than δ, and have an incentive to deviate to p0(p(n)).
Finally, if AC(q) is constant, we can mimic the argument in Proposition
7.
236.2 Free Entry
For the market M(r,n), let P(r) = (p1(r),···,pn(r)) denote a multiple price
free entry Bertrand equilibrium. For this case, the limit equilibrium set T0
is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition: T0 = {p : there is a sequence < P0(r) > such that ∀ > 0,
∃r() so that ∀r > r(), there is an integer n and a free entry equilibrium for
the market M(r,n) in which all active ﬁrms charge prices that are within
an -neighborhood of p}.
We then provide a partial characterization of T0.
Proposition 9. Assume that c∗ < ˆ p and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 7
hold. Then T0 ⊇ [c∗,d∗] ∩ V ∩ ˜ F. Further, no p < c∗, or p > d∗, or p / ∈ V
can be in T0.
Proof. Clearly, in any free entry equilibrium, the price charged by any
active ﬁrm must be at least c∗, so, for any p ∈ T0, p ≥ c∗. We then argue
that for any p ∈ T0, p ≤ d∗. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. d∗ = ˆ p. As in the proof of Proposition 4, for r suﬃciently
large ∃p0(r) which is the maximum p satisfying rf(p) = q∗. Further, for
r suﬃciently large, ˆ p > p0(r) > c∗. Now suppose to the contrary p > d∗.
Then, for r large enough, the least price charged by the active ﬁrms, p(r) ≥
ˆ p > p0(r) > c∗. But then an inactive ﬁrm could undercut by charging p0(r),
and make a strictly positive proﬁt.
Case 2. d∗ < ˆ p. As in the proof of Proposition 4, for r suﬃciently large,
∃ > 0 small enough such that AC(rf(d∗ − )) < d∗ − . Now suppose to
the contrary that p > d∗. Then for any free entry equilibrium where r is
suﬃciently large, the least price charged by the active ﬁrms is at least d∗.
But then, for  > 0 but suﬃciently small, an inactive ﬁrm could deviate to
price d∗ − , sell rf(d∗ − ) and earn a strictly positive proﬁt.
24Next consider some p / ∈ V . Then ∀q0(p) satisfying AC(q) = p, AC(q) is
strictly positively sloped at q0(p). First suppose such a q0(p) exists. If p ∈ T,
then there is some market M(r,n) and some free entry equilibrium such that
the least price charged by the active ﬁrms is p0, where p0 is arbitrarily close
to p. Since V is closed, AC(q) is positively sloped at q0(p0). Since the active
ﬁrms make non-negative proﬁts, the output level of any active ﬁrm is less
than equal to q0(p0). Then an inactive ﬁrm can match p0 and earn a strictly
positive proﬁt. Next suppose such a q0(p) does not exist. Then p > d∗, and
we can mimic the argument in case 2 above.
Finally, we can mimic the proof of Proposition 4 to claim that all p in
[c∗,d∗] ∩ V ∩ ˜ F belongs to T0.
Note that Proposition 9 achieves a partial characterization of T0. For a
full characterization one needs to show that if p / ∈ ˜ F, then p / ∈ T0. Whether
this is true is an open question.
We ﬁnally write down an analogue of Proposition 5.
Proposition 10. Suppose that c∗ < ˆ p and Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 5
hold.
(i) If Assumption 7 holds (so that c∗ < b), then the folk theorem fails to
holds.
(ii) If c∗ = b, then the folk theorem holds if and only if AC(q) is constant
and p is well deﬁned.
Proof. Case 1. Suppose c∗ < b. Then [c∗,b] ⊆ V . There are two
sub-cases to consider:
1(a). First, consider the case where p is not well deﬁned. We can then
mimic the proof of Proposition 5 to argue that ∃b > p > c∗, such that p ∈ ˜ F.
But then p ∈ T0.
1(b). Next suppose p is well deﬁned. Then f(p) > f(c∗). We can mimic
the proof of Proposition 5 to argue that ∃0 > 0, such that ∀p ∈ [c∗,c∗ +0],
25∃p0(p,r) > p such that f(p0(p,r)) > f(p) and [p0(p,r) − AC(rf(p0(p,r)) −
rf(p))] > 0. Consider some free entry equilibrium where the highest price
charged by some active ﬁrm is p < c∗+0. Thus such a p cannot be sustained
as a free entry equilibrium for any r, however large, as one of inactive ﬁrms
can deviate to p0(p,r) and make a gain.
Case 2. Suppose c∗ = b so that, from Assumption 5(ii), AC(q) is either
increasing, or constant. First consider the case where AC(q) is increasing.
Suppose that there is some free entry equilibrium where the lowest price
charged by some active ﬁrm is p, where p > b. Then one of the inactive
ﬁrms can match this price and make a positive proﬁt.
We next consider the case where AC(q) is constant. Note that in any
free entry equilibrium, the lowest price charged by the active ﬁrms must be
c∗. Suppose p is not well deﬁned, so that ∀p > c∗, f(c∗) > f(p). Thus,
∀r, there is a unique free entry equilibrium where all the active ﬁrms charge
c∗. Next suppose p is well deﬁned, so that f(p) > f(c∗). But then, the
ﬁrms charging c∗ will have an incentive to deviate to p when they obtain a
positive proﬁt.
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